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"PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY": TWO STEPS FORWARD
Kent Greenawalt*
In this Response to Professor Peters, Professor Greenawalt argues that prescriptive
equality does have meaningful normative force. Prescriptive equality plays a reinforcing
role when it agrees with nonegalitarian justice and is not incoherent when it pulls
against nonegalitarianjustice. Specifically, when one individual has been treated better
than is required by nonegalitarianjustice, a similarly situated and significantly related
individual who is aware of that treatment may merit equivalent treatment because of
widespread and deep-seatedfeelings about equality.

I.

INTRODUCTION: FEELINGS ABOUT EQUAL TREATMENT

When my late wife, Sanja, and I learned that our oldest son Robert's school was offering Suzuki group violin lessons, we perceived the
chance for him to develop some musical talent, despite the liability of
having unmusical parents. As the academic year wore on, we realized
that the instructional periods were very brief, and Robert's progress
modest. In April, his Suzuki teacher told us that Robert would have
to master a few of Mozart's Twinkle variations if he was to play with
the group in the spring concert. With some pressure and effort all
around (including my learning to play the variations myself), Robert
achieved sufficient mastery, and we were able to beam proudly during
his concert performance. Robert, however, was uninterested in a second year of Suzuki lessons. On reflection, we concluded that his time
and our money had been largely misspent.
The next September, our second child, Sasha, then in senior kindergarten, wanted to join the Suzuki program. We strongly suspected
that his main reason was that Robert had done so, and we urged him
not to insist, explaining that we doubted the program's value. Sasha
insisted. Although we anticipated that Sasha's time and our money
would likely be misspent, and assumed that we would have said "no"
if we had held our present opinion and Sasha had been the first child
involved, we nevertheless gave in. Sasha also mastered the Twinkle
variations and dropped the program after a year.
This tale may have something to do with seeds that bear unexpected fruit in a long-distant future, since Robert was fleetingly a Croatian rap star' and Sasha played bass for a number of rock bands.
However, the story also reflects feelings that underlie ideas of equality.
As Sasha saw it, he did not want to be denied a benefit given to Rob* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law. I am very grateful to Kenneth
Simons for his helpful comments.
I See Students' Rap Song Tops Charts in Zagreb, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 8, ggz, § x, at 67.
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ert, and we, his parents, thought that his desire for equal treatment
had some kind of force.
In this Response, I explore just what kind of force these feelings
may have, and offer a few observations on their relation to equality in
legal treatment. My primary focus is on two recent articles by Christopher Peters. In the first article, Professor Peters claims that no deontological principle of equality justifies the doctrine of precedent. 2 In
the second article, which appears in this issue, he mounts a more exhaustive attack on the principle of prescriptive equality. 3 Reviewing
various circumstances in which this principle might be asserted, he
concludes that the principle proves to be unpersuasive, and indeed is
incoherent and self-contradictory in many or all settings. After a brief
account of how Professor Peters's claims fit within discussions of
equality, I contend, using examples and abstract arguments, that his
broad negative conclusions are unwarranted. I also offer some suggestions about when claims of prescriptive equality have force and what
kind of force they have. In particular, I believe that the principle has
force at least when two equals stand in some significant relationship to
each other, and when the one who might receive worse treatment is
aware that the other is an equal in relevant respects and has received
better treatment. The principle derives its power from deep-seated
feelings that unequal treatment is unfair, feelings that generate resentment and envy. Nevertheless, my Response is more critical than constructive: I present no fully developed scheme of my own, and on
some difficult questions I lack confident answers. One ambition of the
discussion is to shift attention to inquiries about equality that promise
to be fruitful.

II. THE FORMAL

PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PRESCRIITIVE EQUALITY

In 1982, Peter Westen published an article entitled The Empty Idea
of Equality.4 In this article, Professor Westen argued that, to identify
who counts as equal and to decide what constitutes equal treatment,
one has to elaborate standards for how people should be treated.
Thus, the formal principle of equality - "equals should be treated
equally" (or some variant, such as "likes should be treated alike') adds nothing to what the standards for treatment already indicate.
According to Professor Westen, the principle of equality is tautological
and empty. To illustrate, if a teacher decides that all students who get
2 See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, io5 YALE L.J. 2031 (i996).
3 See Christopher J.Peters, Equality Revisited, xio HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1997).
4 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). Professor
Westen subsequently wrote a more comprehensive book on the subject. See PETER WESTEN,
SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (iggo).
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91% of the answers correct on an exam should be awarded an A-, the
comment that two students who get 9i% should be treated equally

tells us nothing new. Each student should get a grade commensurate
with her performance on the exam. If that happens, equals will be
treated equally, but equal treatment will be a simple product of correct treatment according to relevant substantive criteria.
Professor Westen's article drew a number of responses, including
one by me suggesting in part that, notwithstanding Westen's argument, the formal principle of equality might yet have normative force.,
I granted Westen's point that one could not typically tell which people
and what treatment are equal without substantive standards, but I argued that the formal principle could stand as a reason not to give
unequal treatment to equals. I pointed out that sometimes we are confident that two people count as relatively equal - for example, that
they should be punished equally - before we have decided what
treatment they should receive. 6 I noted that the principle of equality
could sometimes stand as a reason against experimenting with two
people - that is, giving two equals different treatment to learn something about the effects of each treatment. 7 Most important for purposes of the law, I urged that, if someone has already been given
better than appropriate treatment, the principle of equality could constitute one reason to give his equal better treatment than would otherwise be appropriate.
Imagine, for example, two co-participants in a crime who are similar in every relevant respect. Judge A has given the first participant a
suspended sentence. Judge B, who is to sentence the second, believes
that six months in jail is appropriate, but hesitates to impose a more
severe sentence on the second offender than the one his partner has
received. The equality principle suggests a more lenient sentence than
do other considerations. The principle also works in this manner
when parents have given a (perceived) benefit that they now regret to
one sibling, as in my Suzuki story, and another sibling wants the same
benefit. Arguably, the principle might also support following precedents in law that current judges regard as mistaken. The idea is that
it would be unfair if the similarly placed litigant in the second case
receives worse treatment than the winning litigant in the first case.
Professor Peters's articles lie in the skeptical tradition of Professor
Westen's, but they self-consciously adopt a position that is crucially
different. Professor Peters identifies what he calls a "principle of prescriptive equality," according to which "the bare fact that a person has
S See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1169-73 (1983).
6 See id. at 1171-72.
7 See ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOw, ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH:
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 235-36 (2d ed. 1991).
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been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating another,
identically situated person in the same way."8 He acknowledges that
this claimed principle of morality is not tautological in Westen's sense,
but asserts that on examination it proves to be misguided and even
incoherent. Professor Peters supports his position by categorization of
various kinds of situations, examination of examples within the categories he has developed, and abstract argumentation demonstrating that
the principle of equality cannot be valid.
The two steps in my Response's title refer to two aspects of Professor Peters's analysis. First, using a grading example from my earlier
essay, Professor Peters patiently shows that the principle of prescriptive equality, as he formulates it, is not tautological.9 If this point was
not clear to American readers after, among others, the initial responses
to Westen and Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom,10 one hopes
that the conclusion will be obvious to anyone who reads Professor Peters's Article, and that the muddled claim of emptiness, in the sense of
tautology, will not rear its head again.
My title's second step refers to Professor Peters's serious effort to
unpack the possible normative force of a principle of prescriptive
equality. Once we perceive just where his argument is and is not persuasive, we can begin to take the needed next step - a fuller, subtler
account of what the force of the principle may be. My Response not
only answers arguments that Professor Peters makes, but also begins
to develop a more comprehensive and satisfactory account.
Before I engage the "principle of prescriptive equality" directly, I
should note that I differ with Professor Peters about how this principle
relates to the formal principle of equality that "equals should be
treated equally." Does the formal principle definitely include prescriptive equality, definitely not include it, or is it ambiguous? Professor
Peters supposes that prescriptive equality "means something other
than what [the formal principle's] traditional expression allows."" I
have always thought that the formulation "equals should be treated
equally" (and variations thereon) incorporates the idea that giving a
form of treatment to one equal is a reason to give the same treatment
to another equal. The fact that the formal principle might otherwise
be "empty" has struck me as a solid reason to ascribe this content to
it. Professor Peters's conclusion that the "traditional expression" does
not allow such an inclusion is puzzling, although he might plausibly
claim that the traditional formulation is ambiguous or indecisive about
8 Peters, supra note 3, at 1223 (emphasis omitted). Foolish Consistency has a formulation

that is identical except for the absence of the comma. See Peters, supra note
omitted).
9 See Peters, supa note 3, at 1222-27.
10 See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORAL=TY OF FREEDOM 217-44 (I986).
11 Peters, supra note 3, at 1223.

2, at 2062
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prescriptive equality. I do not pursue our disagreement about the content of the formal principle further, however, because the crucial concern is the force of a norm of prescriptive equality.

III.
A.

UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY
"Reinforcement" and "Pulling Against" the Balance of Other
Reasons

As I have noted, Professor Peters puts the claim of prescriptive
equality as follows: "the bare fact that a person has been treated in a
certain way is a reason in itself for treating another, identically situated person the same way." 12 Joseph Raz offers a similar (although
not identical) formulation: "All Fs who do not have G have a right to
G if some Fs have G."' 3 If such a principle were valid, it could reinforce other reasons to give someone a particular benefit or burden. It
could also pull against the balance of other, nonegalitarian reasons, by
pointing toward a treatment different from what these other reasons
would indicate. If the principle of prescriptive equality possesses this
second kind of force, then it will sometimes be decisive, leading to
treatment different from that indicated by the balance of other
4

reasons.1

My talk of "reinforcement" and "pulling against" is not meant to
introduce any profound or controversial moral claim, but rather to refer to a common moral understanding more straightforward than these
abstract terms. Let me illustrate. People often suppose that there exists a deontological moral norm against telling serious lies. In most
situations, one has other good reasons to communicate what one believes is true, and no good reasons to lie. In those situations, the norm
against lying will add some extra force to, will "reinforce," the independent reasons to tell the truth. Sometimes, independent reasons
not to tell the truth (say, because it will be very hurtful) are stronger
than any independent reasons to tell the truth. The norm against lying counters, "pulls against," the balance of other reasons. In a situation in which there are some independent reasons to tell the truth, but
stronger independent reasons not to do so, the anti-lying norm will
both "reinforce" reasons to be truthful and "pull against" the balance
of the reasons that do not include the norm. If we understand that
reasons for action can relate to each other in this way, we can also
understand that sometimes the norm against lying will be strong
enough to determine that one should be truthful, even though the bal12

Id. at

1223

(emphasis omitted).

13 RAZ, supra note io,at 225.
14 Professor Peters agrees that, if the principle were valid, it would sometimes lead to treating
people differently from what would otherwise be appropriate, and therefore wrongly. See Peters,
supra note 3, at 1225-27. As he notes, someone who believes that the principle is valid would not
be likely to describe the treatment as wrong. See id. at 1227 n.34.
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ance of other reasons tips in the opposite direction.15 If the principle
of prescriptive equality has normative force, it "reinforces" and "pulls
against" independent reasons in the same manner as the norm against
lying.
The "reinforcement" effect proves easier to conceptualize than to
argue for or against in particular instances. Assume S and T have
been identified as equals and criteria have been established for their
treatment. Each, for example, has gotten 91% correct on an exam, a
score that warrants an A-.16 S has been awarded an A-. Should T
also be given an A-? Of course, and not only because he deserves it.
For if the principle of prescriptive equality has force, the fact that S
has gotten her A- is an added reason to give equally qualified T an A-.
Turning the point around, suppose T were given a grade lower than
A-. That would be wrong: T would be treated incorrectly under the
relevant standards. According to the principle of prescriptive equality,
T would suffer an added wrong because S has received an A-. In a
sense, T's treatment would be worse than it would have been had he
been the only person taking the exam and been given the "incorrect"
lower grade. Someone who asserts that the principle of prescriptive
equality is misguided claims that, putting aside any consequentialist
considerations, 1 7 the wrong done to T is the same in both instances.
Reinforcement turns out to be hard to evaluate in many individual
circumstances. Once we are sure that someone should be treated in a
certain way, discerning the presence of any extra reasons is elusive.' 8
Further, if we sense that an extra reason may be present, distinguishing between an added deontological norm and expected negative consequences is often also difficult.
Is For example, if the balance of independent reasons in favor of lying is slight, the norm
against lying needs to have only moderate force to make telling the truth the preferable course of
action.
16 One reader has suggested that the grading example "stacks the deck" because grades are
primarily (perhaps entirely) comparative. I am assuming in the example that the professor believes that, at his institution, a particular grade represents a certain level of performance, and that
he attempts to grade by the same standards every year. That assumption is sufficient to sustain
the force of the example, but for readers who find the example inapt, the sentencing one that
follows illustrates the same problem without this arguably diluting feature. A recent "live" grading illustration of substantially more complexity occurred when the College Board raised the
scores of 45,ooo students, because it had not previously recognized the correct answer to a math
question. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Student Proves That S.A.T. Can Be: (D) Wrong, N.Y. TibMs,
Feb. 7, 1997, at Ai.
17 As I explain in Part V below, two related problems complicate the question of exactly
which considerations are put aside. One problem is the uncertain borderline of deontological and
consequentialist considerations. Another problem is the status of a rule-consequentialist approach.
If a person adopts a principle because of its desirable consequences in general, but does not assess
consequences in individual instances, would that count as "consequentialist considerations"? My
formulation at this stage is intentionally vague.
18 See RAZ, supra note xo, at 239-40.
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Instances of prescriptive equality possibly pulling against the balance of other reasons are etched more clearly. Suppose S's actual
score on the exam is 89, which the professor previously determined is
the top of the B+ range. The professor has computed her grade
inaccurately and awarded S an A-. He then realizes his mistake but,
having informed S she will get an A-, feels he cannot change the
grade. T also gets an 89. Because no student has scored between 87
and 89 (the B+ range), giving T the higher grade will not create any
obvious inequity between him and students who have scored less well.
Is S's grade, in itself, a reason to give T an A-? According to the
principle of prescriptive equality, the answer is yes. According to opponents of the principle, the answer is no.
An example I have already mentioned raises the same dilemma
more seriously. Judge A gives a convicted offender a suspended sentence, and Judge B, who must sentence the equally guilty co-participant, believes that that sentence is too lenient. Is the sentence Judge
A has given to the first co-participant a reason for Judge B nevertheless to award a suspended sentence? The answer to this question depends on whether the principle of prescriptive equality validly applies
in this context. For such examples, tests by reflective intuition 19 seem
more promising than such tests concerning possible reinforcement.
B.

How the Principle Can Operate Before Initial Treatment Is
Determined

The formulations of Professor Peters and Professor Raz that I have
quoted contain a potentially misleading temporal dimension.2 0 The
implication of their terms is that the principle springs into play only
after someone has already received correct or incorrect treatment.
(This assumption, indeed, becomes the source of one mistaken argument Professor Peters offers against the principle.) Typical applications of the principle do involve the temporal sequence Professor
Peters assumes, but that sequence is not inevitable. If a decisionmaker
is determining treatment for two equal people at one moment in time,
he may be moved by the equality principle not to differentiate between them, although doing so might otherwise be desirable - say, in

19 By "reflective intuition," I mean an intuition that survives some examination and testing,
but does not necessarily involve the comparison to a comprehensive theory sometimes implied by
the term "reflective equilibrium." See JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971).
20 Professor Peters also provides formulations that do not include the temporal sequence. One
is: "Identically situated people are entitled to be treated identically.. .. " Peters, supra note 3, at
1225 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1226 n.33 (suggesting that favorable incorrect treatment might give rise to a claim by someone previously treated correctly, but not explicitly recognizing that a prediction of incorrect treatment could give rise to the principle).
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order to experiment. If valid, the principle
applies to simultaneous
21
treatments and decisions about treatment.
More significantly, perhaps, the principle could also influence a
first decisionmaker who is confident a second decisionmaker will make
a mistake. (Barring psychological aberration, this will not occur when
the same person makes both decisions, because he will not predict a
future mistake by himself.) Suppose Judge B sentences first and
knows that Judge A, who opposes imprisonment unless an offense is
very serious, is virtually certain to suspend the sentence of one coparticipant, whatever Judge B does. If the principle of prescriptive
equality has force, it could affect Judge B's initial choice of sentence.
C.

Other Conditionsfor Application

More complex questions about the principle as formulated by Professor Peters concern what he means by "the bare fact" and "a reason
in itself," in his statement that "the bare fact that a person has been
treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating another, identically situated person the same way." 22 One question this formulation
raises is whether other conditions might be necessary to bring the
principle into play. Suppose that the principle applies only when the
two equals receiving treatment have some significant relationship and
at least one is aware of the treatment the other receives. If these conditions are necessary for the principle's application, one might defend
Professor Peters's rejection of the principle on the ground that "the
bare fact" of a first person's treatment is not alone enough to call for
equal treatment of an equal. Professor Peters's skepticism, however,
goes much further. He argues that under no set of conditions does the
treatment of one person in a particular way generate a deontological
norm to treat someone else the same way.
D.

Consequentialist Considerations

The more important question about "the bare fact" and "a reason
in itself' is what consequentialist considerations Professor Peters excludes. He is clear that he does not contest doctrines of precedent that
rest on reliance, fair notice, and efficiency, among other considerations. 23 For Professor Peters, ordinary consequentialist reasons to afford equal treatment in certain contexts do not support the
(deontological) principle of prescriptive equality.2 4 Thus, Professor Peters can accept various consequentialist reasons for equal treatment
21 Indeed, the medical and lifeboat examples Professor Peters uses are of this sort. See id. at
1232-43.
22

Id. at

1223

(emphasis omitted).

23 See Peters, supra note 2, at 2037-38.
24 See Peters, supra note 3, at 1238 n.46,

1257

n.67.
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and still reject the principle as a principle. His fundamental claim is
that any deontological norm of prescriptive equality is indefensible.
Professor Peters never discusses a certain kind of consequentialist
consideration I emphasize: the desirability of satisfying feelings of affected persons that unequal treatment is intrinsically unfair. One
might say: "Such feelings are common, but they are normatively unwarranted. We who are wiser may need to accede to such feelings on
occasion, but only to avoid adverse consequences." I suggest near the
end of this Response that deep feelings of intrinsic unfairness raise
difficult issues about the border between deontological norms and consequentialist considerations. Here, I restrict myself to noting that Professor Peters does not discuss such feelings. 25 For now, I assume that
the principle of prescriptive equality has force if it appropriately
guides action because of such deep-seated feelings.
E.

What Normative Force?

We can identify at least five ways of viewing the normative force
of the principle of equality. First, the principle may be tautological
and empty. Second, it may not be empty in this way, but it may
prove on examination to be mistaken or even incoherent. Third, the
principle may carry direct deontological force, indicating moral considerations that do not depend on the consequences of an action. Fourth,
the principle may reflect generally applicable consequentialist considerations. Fifth, the principle may express deep-rooted feelings, not easily
dispelled, to which decisionmakers appropriately are responsive. As I
shall later explain, I do not here treat the fifth possibility as a subcategory of the third or fourth category, because of perplexities about
where to draw a line between deontological norms and consequentialist considerations.
We should not suppose that the principle of equality will necessarily have the same force in all contexts. My own tentative conclusion is
that it carries force when at least one of the two "equals" identifies
significantly with the other, when that person is aware of what is happening to both, and when he may be given less favorable treatment
than the other. In such instances, deep-rooted feelings call for equal
treatment. Believing that these feelings usually cannot be dispelled by
"explanation," I think they are one appropriate guide to action.

2S One reader has suggested that because Professor Peters, in leaving the content of nonegalitarian justice open, see id. at 1228-3o, does not discuss any consequentialist considerations in
depth, we should not expect him to discuss these feelings. However, because Professor Peters is
rejecting the principle as a deontological norm, one would expect him to discuss feelings that it is
such a norm, if he thought them very significant. Further, his suggestion that feelings.that coincide with the outcome of the principle can be otherwise explained, see, e.g., id. at 1257, also
indicates that Professor Peters does not think the feelings attached to equality are significant
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F. Prescriptive Equality and Other Issues About Equality
Neither Professor Peters's articles nor this Response focuses on
what we have come to consider as the major issues about equality in
Western societies. These issues concern the criteria that may be used
to determine how people should be treated. Laws against discrimination according to race, religion, and gender are grounded in the view
that, in many circumstances, it is immoral to employ certain criteria to
determine how people are treated. This view raises delicate questions
concerning the steps government and private enterprise should take to
see that opportunities in life do not depend on these characteristics. Is
affirmative action appropriate? Should pornography and hate speech
be suppressed because they help perpetuate discrimination against
women and minorities? Against these critical social issues, the subject
of Professor Peters's inquiry is narrow and comparatively insignificant.
But it is definitely worth our attention. Understanding what reasons
we may have, if any, for treating equals equally, when one is not receiving what would otherwise be the best form of treatment, is important. That understanding may illuminate other aspects of the concept
26
of equality.

IV.

THE CHALLENGE TO PREscRIPTIvE EQUALITY

Professor Peters attacks normative claims on behalf of the principle
of prescriptive equality in two stages. Usefully breaking down categories of situations in which the principle might apply, he first concludes
that, in "conditions of competition,"2 7 the principle turns out either to
yield absurd results or, when the right course of action would correspond with the principle, not to explain our intuitions. Professor Peters then considers "conditions of infinite supply."28 He contends that
the principle reveals itself to be incoherent and self-contradictory when
it seems to suggest treatment different from what would otherwise be
appropriate. The reasons Professor Peters offers that the principle is
incoherent and self-contradictory for conditions of infinite supply also
apply to conditions of competition3 9 Thus, anyone wishing to defend

26 1 see "substantive" questions about equality as more closely linked to what Professor Peters
calls the principle of prescriptive equality than he does. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at x168;
Peters, supra note 3, at 1213-14. I have discussed substantive questions elsewhere. See generally
KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION passim (1983) (discussing
issues of discrimination and affirmative action); Kr
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS possim
(I995) (discussing a number of free speech issues in which equality figures prominently).
27 Peters, supra note 3, at 1232 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
29 In Foolish Consistency, Professor Peters explicitly puts forward the claim about incoherence as applicable to all assertions of the principle. See Peters, supra note 2, at 2o67-72. But see
Peters, supra note 3, at 1245-54 (referring only to conditions of infinite supply).

1997]

"PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY-. TWO STEPS FORWARD

1275

the principle in its application to conditions of competition must meet
the incoherence claim as well as other challenges.
Professor Peters's discussion of competition does establish that acting on the principle of equality is often inapt, but it does not show
that this is always true, or even that the principle lacks all force in
situations in which acting upon it is unwise. Professor Peters's analysis of infinite supply and the supposed incoherence of the principle
highlights features of prescriptive equality, but it fails to recognize the
limited class of relevant persons in many situations. Further, it gives a
misleading account of the relation between the principle and other
standards of decision. By assessing the strengths and shortcomings of
Professor Peters's demonstrations, we will be in a much better position
to evaluate the forcefulness of claims of equality.
A.

Conditions of Competition

Professor Peters devotes fourteen pages of his Article to conditions
of competition,30 in which the amount of treatment given to one person "necessarily affects the amount of that treatment available to other
identically situated people."3 1 Most of the analysis is about conditions
of scarcity, for which Professor Peters employs a medical example and
a lifeboat example.
The medical example illustrates "divisible treatments." 32 Smith and
Jones, equals in need and entitlement, could each use ioo units of
medicine, but there are only i5o units for them both. The egalitarian
would rightly say each should receive 75 units. Professor Peters responds, however, that we would reach the same answer according to
nonegalitarian justice:
Any result that apportions more medicine to one than to the other...
necessarily violates nonegalitarian justice, because it necessarily treats
Smith or Jones according to some criterion that is not relevant ....

If

Smith is being treated differently from Jones, it must be because an irrelevant criterion for treatment,
or an incorrect weighing of criteria for
3
treatment, is being applied.3
Professor Peters uses the lifeboat example for "indivisible treatments."3 4 The lifeboat will stay afloat only if it carries ten or fewer
people. Eleven equal people are available for the ten places; anyone
denied a place will drown. Professor Peters supposes that the treatment cannot be divided up.3s Because justice is constrained by the
30 See Peters, supra note 3, at 1232-45. On conditions of competition, see Larry Alexander,

Constrained by Precedent, 63 S.

CAL.

L.

REv. 1, 12

(I989).

31 Peters, supra note 3, at 1231. The phrase "necessarily affects" may be too strong for the
last two categories Professor Peters discusses.
32 Id. at 1232 (emphasis omitted).
33 Id. at 1235.
34 Id. at 1232 (emphasis omitted).
3S That is, the eleven cannot take turns swimming or clinging to the boat from the water.
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possible, and it would be absurd for all eleven to drown,
"[p]rescriptive equality . . appears enfeebled to the point of
irrelevance in conditions of scarcity of indivisible treatments." 36 Each
of the eleven could be given an equal chance at a place in the lifeboat,
for instance by lottery, but nonegalitarian justice would call for the
same treatment in any event.
Professor Peters's primary examples and discussion contain a
double fallacy. The first fallacy is his assumption that, whenever following the principle of equality is absurd (as in the lifeboat example)
or is dictated by nonegalitarian justice, the principle lacks normative
force. The second fallacy is the supposition that the examples capture
all the relevant situations within his categories, and that one would
therefore never act on the principle of equality unless the same action
were dictated by other considerations. I shall attend mainly to the
second fallacy, offering a brief comment about the first.
Consider a variation on the medical example that may straddle the
categories of divisible and indivisible benefits. In this example, the
benefits are divisible, but likely usefulness is disproportional to the
amount of benefit. By some measure of medical effectiveness, 75 units
of the medicine is one and a half times as good as 50 units, but ioo
units is more than twice as good as 5o. We could imagine that, for
people bitten by a poisonous snake, ioo units is ioo% likely to save
their lives, 75 units is 6o% likely, and 5o units is 40% likely.37 The
total lifesaving potential will be maximized by a 00-50 split of the
units of medicine among our snake-bitten equals, Smith and Jones. If
the medicine is split unequally in this way, the chance that one life
will be saved is ioo%, and the chance that both lives will be saved is
40%. If the medicine is split equally, the chance of saving both lives is
36% (o.6 x o.6); the chance of saving at least one is 84% (I - (0.4 x
0.4)). In contrast to the case of the indivisible scarce benefit of the
lifeboat, equal treatment here is a practical possibility, and, in contrast
to Professor Peters's own medical example, doctors have good reason
to give unequal treatment, because it would maximize the potential
saving of life. I believe that, in some settings, such as when Smith and
Jones are close friends, members of the same family, companions on a
trip, or perhaps even patients of the same doctor without other connection, one might well opt for equal dosage despite its lower medical
effectiveness. Professor Peters seems to deny this conclusion, although
the hypotheticals on which he concentrates do not cover such circum-

36 Peters, supra note 3, at 1238.

37 For purposes of the illustration, I assume that nothing less than ioo units will be xoo%

likely to save a life. I also omit consideration of intermediate alternatives, such as a go-6o split.
Professor Peters considers a similar illustration briefly, commenting that more total nonegalitarian
justice would be achieved by an unequal distribution of medicine. See id. at 1233 n.43.
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stances.38 Of course, one might allow Smith and Jones to choose (if
they are not unconscious or small children) or perform a lottery on
their behalf.3 9 But the sense of some normative pull toward 75 units
for each is neither confused nor obviously misguided.
One can imagine altered factual assumptions that would make the
lifeboat choice more troublesome than the one Professor Peters
presents. To simplify, suppose that everyone will definitely survive if
only ten are in the boat, and that if eleven are in the boat, there is an
8o% chance all will survive and a 20% chance all will perish. The
expected value in lifesaving of taking all eleven is 8.8 (ii x 0.8), as
compared with io if only ten are taken. Given these odds, one might
conceivably choose equal treatment over optimizing the projected saving of life.
Similarly, one might choose equality in preference to a relatively
trivial indivisible scarce benefit. 40 If two siblings would like a certain
toy as a gift and only one is available, a parent might buy somewhat
41
less favored toys for both, leaving the most favored toy in the shop.
What do my examples show? They certainly do not demonstrate
that the "right action" is the one to which the principle of equality
points. But they do illustrate how that principle might pull some people to treat equals equally, although other considerations would suggest a different outcome.
If this much is granted, could we view the principle as relevant in
Professor Peters's lifeboat and medical examples? We might see the
principle as exerting some slight normative force for equal treatment
in the lifeboat example, although that force is easily overcome by the
desirability of saving lives. In respect to Professor Peters's medical
example, we might conceive the principle of equality as reinforcing in38 Professor Peters often talks about what nonegalitarian justice calls for, and someone might
wonder if the example is irrelevant to his claims because the reason for unequal treatment concerns welfare, not justice. However, Professor Peters explicitly says that his construct of nonegalitarian justice includes "the net effect of all the relevant (nonegalitarian)criteria." Id. at 1228. In
any event, if one conceded that a principle of equality could count against independent welfare
considerations, one would probably concede that it could count against "nonegalitarian justice,"
more narrowly conceived than by Professor Peters.
39 If Smith and Jones were risk-averse in a certain peculiar way, they might each prefer receiving 75 units to having a So% chance of receiving zoo units and a So% chance of receiving So
units. However, the lottery, viewed before the drawing, actually maximizes each's chance of survival in comparison with equal dosage.
40 Professor Peters discusses a similar example. See Peters, supra note 3, at 124o n.49. His
conclusion that one should not withhold the more favored treatment (for example, tickets to the
World Series) because justice is constrained by the possible is not convincing. If the principle of
equality is valid, it may well be more just overall to withhold the favored treatment See LLOYD
L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 163 (1987).
41 In my earlier piece, I raised a more troubling adoption example in which twins are to be
placed separately and one available home is better than all others. See Greenawalt, supra note 5,
at N172-73. As Raz points out, "'eigalitarian principles often lead to waste," because they suggest
wasting a benefit that cannot go around. RAZ, supra note io, at 227.
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dependent reasons to give each patient the same amount of the drug.
The principle of equality could exert some normative force even when
the action for which it calls is either clearly required for other reasons,
or obviously absurd because countervailing reasons are so strong.
After discussing conditions of scarcity, Professor Peters moves to
conditions of exact sufficiency (200 units of medicine, Smith and Jones
each needing ioo units) and of finite surplus (250 units of medicine).
In both circumstances, equals can get all they deserve. In both, it
would be wrong if one person is given so much (Smith gets 175 units)
that another receives less than he deserves, but Professor Peters assures us that we do not need the principle of equality to explain why.
Professor Peters is right that the injustice of the distinction can be
explained without reference to any principle of equality. Again, however, it does not follow that the principle has no force.
B.

Conditions of Infinite Supply

In what Professor Peters calls conditions of infinite supply, no
shortage of a given treatment will occur. 42 Because a judge does not
have a limited number of suspended sentences, the judge's choice as to
whether to give the co-participant a suspended sentence is made under
conditions of infinite supply. And, because my wife and I could have
afforded group violin lessons for all our children, the same was true of
43
our choice whether to give our second child, Sasha, the lessons.
As an example of this category, Professor Peters imagines a lottery
in which the bearer of one $5oo,ooo ticket, Ms. Lucky, is mistakenly
given $6oo,ooo. Should another holder of a $5oo,ooo ticket, Mr. Unlucky, also be given $6oo,ooo? Professor Peters initially puts aside
42 Professor Peters also discusses conditions of distinction, which he regards as special cases of
his other examples. See Peters, supra note 3, at 1231. He refers to situations in which deserved
treatment is denied on grounds such as race. Here, he says the substantive wrong is basing a
decision on an irrelevant criterion, not a violation of prescriptive equality. See id. at x254-56.
My own view is a bit different: the claim that race is irrelevant is a claim that people equal
except for race should be regarded as equal. This issue is an important concern for theorists of
equality writ large, but it does not concern the force of a narrower principle of prescriptive equality. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 1178-83. Once the determination is made that members of
different races are equal, then the principle of prescriptive equality kicks in. (If this conclusion is
correct, it may be a worse wrong if a white is given a benefit and a black is denied the benefit
because of race, than if the black is the only person concerned and he is denied the benefit
because of race.) Interestingly, because racial classifications cause humiliation in some instances
by implying that some people are not fit to associate with others, the principle of equal treatment
can apply to matters that would otherwise be unproblematic, such as positions in a class photograph. I shall not treat further the issue of classification by improper criteria, because it presents
serious issues that do not turn on the possible validity of a narrow principle of prescriptive
equality.
43 It might be said that any benefit that costs money cannot be provided infinitely. Professor
Peters's own lottery example shows that he does not mean the category to be understood so
literally.
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"consequences that disserve nonegalitarian justice"4 4 before proceeding
to the claim that the principle of prescriptive equality proves to be
self-contradictory, incoherent, and invalid. 45 He makes three
arguments.
x. Self-Contradiction? - Professor Peters's first argument endeavors to establish that prescriptive equality "necessarily contradicts itself."46 If Mr. Unlucky is given $6oo,ooo, he will be "treated
unequally with respect to a whole different set of people: everyone
who has ever received just treatment according to nonegalitarian
47
justice."
We might take what Professor Peters says here as implicitly concentrating on other lottery winners of $5oo,ooo or like sums. If Mr.
Unlucky receives the windfall Ms. Lucky has received, those who do
not receive extra money are being treated unequally to him. Here,
Professor Peters is on solid ground. But often the pool of relevant
potential beneficiaries is closed: all within the pool might be given the
favorable treatment. In the sentencing example, two people committed
a particular crime together. The most relevant comparison is between
each of these two people, not between these two people and others
who may have committed somewhat similar crimes, but who cannot
easily be identified as exactly equal to our two offenders in terms of
what they deserve.
Similar analysis applies to my grading and family examples. In
family situations generally, parents are mainly responsible for their
own children, not all children. Because most parents can give many
particular benefits to all of their similarly situated children, there is an
infinite supply of those benefits in Professor Peters's terms, although
the number of aspirants for the benefits is far from infinite. My wife
and I were able to give Suzuki lessons to Sasha without doing an evident injustice to our children, or anyone else's children.
Professor Peters's language suggests a broader point: that those
who receive more favorable treatment than they deserve are being
treated unequally with those who receive any form of treatment they
deserve. As Professor Peters puts it, "[e]very person in the world is
situated identically with respect to his or her entitlement to be treated
justly."48 Mr. Unlucky, if he gets an extra $ioo,ooo, and indeed our
son Sasha, is being treated unequally with respect to every criminal
who ever receives the appropriate sentence. Professor Peters claims
that the principle of prescriptive equality is self-contradictory when44 Peters, supra note 3, at 1248.
4S See id. at 1249-54; see also Peters, supra note

2,

at 2067-73 (offering further arguments to

support this claim).
46 Peters, supra note 3, at 1249.
47 Id.; see also Peters, supra note 2, at 2068 (using similar language).
48 Peters, supra note 2, at 2068; see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1249 (using similarly expansive language).
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ever it might recommend giving people what they do not otherwise
deserve, because equality for them relative to others who have benefited undeservedly comes at the cost of inequality with those who have
been treated appropriately.
This way of speaking is odd: we do not think of people as being
equal simply because they may get some benefit or burden they deserve. We do not suppose that Mr. Unlucky, who may get an extra
$ioo,ooo, is the "equal" of a murderer who deserves life imprisonment
but may receive a sentence of thirty years. Still, Professor Peters apparently contends that these people are equal in deserving to be
treated according to the standards that apply. Let us grant the point
that, in some sense, those who receive more than they deserve are being treated unequally with those who receive what they deserve with
respect to totally different subjects. What follows?
Some comparisons and relationships are far more salient and important than others. In the lottery example, the salient comparison is
with other lottery winners. In the sentencing example, it is with the
other co-participant. The principle of prescriptive equality may have
normative force only when the person who may be less well treated
perceives himself as significantly related to his well treated equal. If
we suppose instead that giving one person better treatment than he
otherwise deserves does involve some slight sacrifice of prescriptive
equality in comparison with all others who are treated justly in various domains, satisfying the principle in relation to those with whom
the connection is closest may rank as vastly more important. (For example, parents and children care much more about fairness within
their own families than about how their treatment compares with
treatment other parents give their children.) If this is so, then application of the principle would be much more complex than one might
first suppose, implicitly evoking an infinite number of comparisons
with every treatment ever given anyone; nonetheless, the dimension of
magnitude of importance would keep the principle from falling into
self-contradiction or incoherence. It does not follow that appropriate
application of the principle will usually be simple. Not infrequently,
one pool of persons may be highly relevant; however, another, larger
pool may be relevant enough to matter substantially. To develop all
the pertinent comparisons may be complex and require much fuller
elaboration of what relationships are significant than I provide in this
Response.
A related point about salience concerns the particular responsibilities of particular agents and is aptly illustrated by the family. Parents
have responsibilities primarily for their own children. Perhaps, when
parents make decisions about their children, the primary questions
about justice, to them, concern the children for whom they have re-
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sponsibility. A worldwide tabulation of instances of deserved and undeserved treatment is not of much relevance for them.
These points about magnitude and agent responsibility matter even
when comparisons are less than global. Within a fairly narrow compass, some relationships are more important than others, and how
anyone should act will depend on the range of her responsibilities.
Thus, the principle of prescriptive equality can have force even when
a repetition of A's undeserved favorable treatment for B may generate
some unfairness vis-a-vis more remotely related C, D, and E, who are
treated as they deserve.
2. Contradiction With NonegalitarianJustice? - Professor Peters's
second argument is that prescriptive equality "necessarily contradicts
nonegalitarian justice," because it calls for treatment "according to the
same irrelevant criterion" used "in the unjust treatment of an identically situated person." 49 This observation has a core of truth, but the
notion of "contradiction" contained in it is troublingly misleading.
If the principle of equality does have normative power, the proper
analysis is as follows. Nonegalitarian relevant criteria may call for one
form of treatment, the principle of equality another (just as independent reasons might call for telling a lie, and the norm against lying for
telling the truth). Prescriptive equality thus would pull in a different
direction from the balance of other criteria. In an overall account of
what is just, one would need to qualify the force of the otherwise relevant criteria in light of deontological or consequentialist considerations
of equality. We qualify the application of some standards for decisions
in light of the relevance of others all the time; it does not follow that
the second standards contradict the first, much less that they are
thereby rendered incoherent. Just as consequentialist considerations
might pull against deontological considerations without contradicting
them or becoming incoherent, so might prescriptive equality also pull
against nonegalitarian considerations without contradicting them or
becoming incoherent.
Professor Peters's own analysis suggests the flaw in his claim that
prescriptive equality necessarily contradicts nonegalitarian justice.
Professor Peters is quite open to the idea that consequentialist considerations may pull toward following precedents. When the precedent
case is believed to be "wrongly decided," the consequentialist reasons
for following it pull against what would be a just and desirable decision according to other standards. Professor Peters sees no contradiction between the reasons for following the precedent and the reasons
for reaching the otherwise just result. What is just or desirable overall
takes into account all relevant reasons. The relationship between a
49 Peters, supra note 3, at 1250. Whether a decision to accord equal treatment demands consideration of irrelevant criteria, see id. at 1253 n.62, depends on whether prescriptive equality
adds a significant factor that was not present for the initial (mistaken) choice.
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deontological principle of prescriptive equality and the just result according to other relevant criteria is analogous.5 0
3. Injustice Based on Random Sequence? - Professor Peters's
third argument is that prescriptive equality is incoherent because it
violates substantive principles of justice by making a correct decision
depend on a random sequence.-5 What would be appropriate treatment if Judge B initially sentenced her offender - six months in jail
- becomes inappropriate because Judge A has given the co-participant a suspended sentence first. I have already indicated why this
argument rests on a misperception.
The principle of prescriptive equality is not limited to second decisions: it applies to first decisions in which the content of the second
decision is highly predictable (for example, when Judge B is virtually
certain Judge A will give a suspended sentence). One might correctly
respond that the principle seems to have its claimed force mainly
when second decisions are involved. One reason is that a single decisionmaker will not commonly predict a future mistake by himself,
though he may recognize a past mistake. A second reason is that a
different decisionmaker is less likely to predict a future mistake by
someone else then to identify a past mistake by someone else. But
these reasons are ones of evaluation and confident prediction; they do
not suggest that the heart of the principle of equality is tied to
sequence.
A different reason emerges that explains why the principle may
seem more forceful when a past mistake is involved. Perhaps, when
an equal receives what the decisionmaker regards as deserved treatment, and he knows his equal has already received better treatment,
he will feel more unfairly treated than when the equal's better treatment follows his own treatment. Whether this differential feeling exists may depend on circumstances. If it does exist, it would show that
the force of the principle ties to people's strong feelings of unfair treatment, not that the principle results in arbitrary applications.
50 Professor Peters may perceive a difference in that the principle of prescriptive equality pulls
against nonegalitarian justice in every instance in which the initial decision is judged to be mistaken. See Peters, supra note 3, at 1250 ("lit necessarily contradicts nonegalitarian justice." (emphasis added)); see also Peters, supra note 2, at 2072 ("Adjudicative consistency, that is, can be
justified by conceptions of nonegalitarian justice that are not inherently and universally self-contradictory."). The answer to this possible argument is that, if no contradiction is involved in a
single instance of tension between prescriptive equality and nonegalitarian criteria, it is irrelevant
whether the tension is always, or only sometimes, present. In any event, it is also true that consequentialist considerations for following precedents will always be in tension with the best decision
according to other criteria if the first decision is mistaken, and Professor Peters does not suppose
that that conflict generates any contradiction.
S1 See Peters, supra note 3, at 1252-53. Professor Peters's contention about random sequencing is in some tension with his acknowledgment that a mistaken second decision might generate a
claim to alter an otherwise correct first decision. Compare id. at 1253 n.63 (random sequencing),
with id. at 1226 n.33 (mistaken second decision).
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What have I demonstrated, and what is its significance? I have
shown that, in many applications, prescriptive equality is not incoherent and self-contradictory. Further, I have shown that, for examples
other than the exact ones Professor Peters has chosen, the principle
has intuitive plausibility. What I have not yet done, however, is show
that it is ever really valid. I now leave the comfortable moorings of
contentious response to examine the troubling issue of validity.
V.

CONSIDERING THE FORCE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY

A developed account of the scope and force of the principle of prescriptive equality would require much that this Response does not
contain. It would need a systematic treatment of various circumstances in which the principle is invoked, and it would need a full
moral theory to which to tie conclusions about equality. Nevertheless,
short of such comprehensiveness, we can make substantial progress in
our understanding of prescriptive equality.
It helps to start by recognizing that the situations for which the
principle has intuitive force are those in which the people are in some
relationship with each other. People feel they have been treated unfairly, they are resentful and envious, if they discover that those whom
they believe to be their equals have been treated better than they
have. This is certainly one powerful lesson of life in a family with
children who are close in age to one another. But are these feelings
any basis for decisions, and, if so, do they support the principle of
equality?
When I told my Suzuki story to a colleague, he responded that
parents should explain to the second child why they thought they had
made a mistake in giving the lessons to the first child. Of course, my
wife and I had tried that unsuccessfully, but perhaps my colleague is
more adept at giving such explanations to five-year-olds than we were.
Even if he is not, his main point could be defended in the following
way: whatever the appropriate response to the powerful feelings of
small children may be, one who deals with adults should expect explanations of previous mistakes to suffice. A reasonable "second person"
should realize he has no right to treatment previously given to an
equal if the present decisionmaker has good reasons for believing a
less favorable treatment is warranted. No doubt, some adult "second
persons" may fail to grasp the point, but neither our decisions nor our
moral understandings should be bent to accommodate the unreasonable, resentful second adult.
Once one understands feelings about equal treatment in this way,
one should recognize a distinction between the range of legitimate influences on decisionmaking and statements of moral principle. I start
from the admittedly debatable premise that, at least in our culture,
and probably in Western culture in general, the feeling that one should
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not receive worse treatment than a perceived equal is fairly deep and
strong and is not dispelled either with maturity or with explanations
of why the judgments of decisionmakers have altered. If this assumption is correct, then one can reasonably expect good decisionmakers to
accede to these feelings to some degree. 52 Thus, although it is possible
that countervailing feelings would sometimes support giving people
"the right treatment," judged apart from how others have been treated,
these feelings about equality would be recognized as a legitimate influence upon decisions.
Professor Peters may not disagree with this conclusion, but he
would respond, I am fairly sure, that even if decisionmakers rightly
accede to feelings about equality to some degree, they do so for consequentialist reasons, not because the principle of prescriptive equality is
valid. According to Professor Raz, "strictly egalitarian principles can
often be instrumentally justified"5 3 because "[t]hey may diminish the
occurrence of envy and hostility,"5 4 though "[tihe prospect of such benefits can easily be exaggerated." ' s On this view, what decisionmakers
do when they accede to such feelings is to render decisions that are
less just in order to reap consequentialist benefits.
I have two answers to the parry that, after all, only consequences
are at issue. The simple answer is that, if analysts wish to call accession to egalitarian feelings consequential, they should acknowledge
that the feelings themselves are not based on consequentialist considerations, as normally understood. The equal who ends up being treated
worse than another often feels wronged, quite apart from whether the
disparate but otherwise deserved treatment places him at any intrinsic
disadvantage in comparison with what his condition would have been
if he had been the only individual involved and received the same
(deserved) treatment. The co-participant sentenced to six months in
jail after his partner in crime receives a suspended sentence will feel
that he has been wronged, though he suffers no competitive disadvantage.5 6 Even if the decisionmaker makes a concession to egalitarian
feelings on a purely consequential basis, the motivation to make this
concession still stems from the deontological sense of injustice, however "misplaced," of affected equals.
S2 In general, this accession will occur when the decisionmaker allocating treatment for the
second person believes a mistake has been made regarding treatment for the first person. However, as I have noted, it could also occur when the decisionmaker dealing with the first person
(for example, the judge first imposing a sentence) confidently predicts that the second declsionmaker (for example, another judge soon to sentence the co-participant) will make a mistake.
53 RAZ, supra note Io,at 233.
54 Id.
5 Id. at 234.
S56If it is said that his co-participant has an advantage, the answer is that usually two partners in crime will not be competing against each other for future benefits in their lives.
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I believe that this explanation is one plausible way of making sense
of the claimed force of the principle of prescriptive equality. On this
understanding, it might be said that the principle itself has no real
force, but rather that the feelings it reflects affect consequentialist considerations. In this way, "prescriptive equality" might properly play a
much greater practical role than Professor Peters's articles would suggest, but what is arguably Professor Peters's major theoretical assertion -

the denial of a deontological principle -

could remain

untouched.
My second answer to the idea that the feelings of equality give rise
only to consequentialist considerations is more complex. This answer
begins with the alternative perspective that the deep feelings that underlie the principle may support a deontological norm. One might attempt to situate the principle within an overall account of
deontological duties and rights. Or, one might claim that deep intuitive moral feelings that are not dispelled by reflection and analysis are
our best guide to valid deontological norms. If Professor Peters's arguments against the principle are unpersuasive and we see no cause for
the feelings that would cast their moral soundness into doubt, 7 then
perhaps we can tentatively conclude that the feelings are reflective of
aspects of deontological justice.58
Once we begin to ask if the principle is deontological or points to
desirable consequences, the question arises as to what exactly makes a
standard deontological, rather than a guide to consequentialist calculation. This question has an important practical dimension - how
should agents respond in particular situations? - as well as a theoretical aspect - how may one best conceptualize conclusions about how
and why agents should act as they should?
It may be tempting to say that all concessions to imperfections are
consequentialist - not true deontological standards. In deontological
terms, one would have a moral right or claim in justice to X only if
one should receive X, even if one were fully reasonable and appropriately generous. However, many of the moral standards accepted in
our culture would be hard to defend on these terms. If people were
always reasonable, their moral right to speak freely might be conceived as more circumscribed than it now is, because part of this right
includes expressing irrational, hostile feelings that may be hurtful to
others. If people were not generally so self-centered, the rich might be
held to have a greater duty to give to the very poor and have less
S7 I mean a cause like the kind a historical explanation might provide for people's having
feelings of racial superiority that are not morally defensible.
58 I do not intend to suggest that prescriptive equality would necessarily provoke this kind of
moral reflection in every culture. Rather, equality fits within the basic moral understanding of
Western liberal democratic cultures and serves to stimulate the moral responses of members of
these cultures in the ways I am suggesting here.
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moral right to keep their wealth. We cannot relegate the principle of
prescriptive equality to the dustbin of consequentialist considerations
simply because people who were completely reasonable and ideally altruistic might accept treatment determined without reference to it.
A better approach to drawing the line between deontological standards and consequentialist considerations asks whether individuals
making decisions should calculate in terms of consequences. Take the
situation where Person i has received a particular treatment, and a
decisionmaker must determine treatment for Person 2, a closely related
equal. The decisionmaker believes that the appropriate treatment is
less favorable than what Person i has received. If we imagine that
only little children and a small percentage of those who are older will
perceive an unfairness if they are Person 2 and receive worse treatment than Person i, then we will conclude that prescriptive equality is
not a principle to be followed generally. At most, decisionmakers
should be alert to perceive feelings that might incline them in individual circumstances toward equality. If instead we suppose that the vast
majority of people are moved by the feelings that prescriptive equality
recognizes, we may think that the principle states a standard that
should generally constitute a reason for action when closely related
equals are to be given benefits or harms. Thus, we may conclude that
the practical force of the principle should not depend on calculations
in individual cases, which decisionmakers might assess inaccurately,
but that the principle should appropriately be given weight in all relevant instances."
We can imagine three distinguishable attitudes a decisionmaker, D,
might take when she is presented with a situation in which the principle of prescriptive equality corresponds with feelings that an equal affected by a decision would commonly have. D might consider
carefully the various likely feelings of the individuals concerned if she
decided in favor of equal treatment or, instead, treated someone as
would otherwise be warranted. In this event, the "principle" would be
no more than a signal to pay attention to possible feelings of unfairness and resentment in the particular situation. A second attitude
would be that D should make a more general consequentialist inquiry.
D would ask what general rule or principle, if followed by decisionmakers in a relevant class of situations, would have the most desirable consequences. The third attitude D might take would be that
the principle has force, independent of assessments of consequences in
the particular situation or in a general class of situations. According
to this account, the first attitude is act-consequentialist, the second attitude rule-consequentialist, and the third attitude deontological.
59 Note that it would be consistent with this approach to allow extra consequentialist weight
if the decisionmaker is sure that feelings of unfairness and resentment will be acute.
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We can ask different questions about these three approaches. One
is descriptive: what attitude do most D's have in our society? Another
is prescriptive: what attitude should D's have? A variation on the second question is, what attitude fits best with the fundamental moral
ideas we now accept? It is entirely consonant with much of what Professor Peters says that people, confused about what deontological justice requires, now give the principle of prescriptive equality an
unwarranted role in their decisions. What Professor Peters mainly
urges is that any considerations that the principle may obliquely reflect are matters of consequence to be assessed by the D's of this
world. Whatever else they may do, D's should not give the principle
60
deontological force.
Could Professor Peters endorse a D's adoption of the principle on
a rule-consequentialist basis? Although he does not absolutely rule out
this possibility in his articles, such an approach would almost certainly
give prescriptive equality much more force than he regards as
justified.
I believe that, because this principle reflects deep feelings of most
people that cannot be dispelled by explanation, D's properly accept it
as a norm of behavior, not merely as a guide to contextual calculations
of consequences. But the question remains whether the principle is a
true deontological or a rule-consequentialist standard.
If decisionmakers ought to consider these matters of equality selfconsciously in terms of which general rules, if followed, will yield the
best consequences, then the principle may be adopted on a rule-consequentialist basis. If solid, convincing arguments that do not relate to
consequences can be made for the principle, then it should be accepted
as a deontological norm. Although I have countered arguments against
the principle and have defended its intuitive plausibility, I have not
presented arguments in its favor that are entirely separate from the
consequences of its application. Perhaps such arguments can be offered, or perhaps intuitions themselves are sufficient to support the
principle. I, however, am inclined toward another possibility: perhaps
it is best if people, when they are acting, regard the principle as deontological, even though the ultimate reasons that that attitude is justified concern the desirable consequences for human life of people
conceiving the principle in this way.
60 Professor Peters says his "project is primarily descriptive, not normative," Peters, supra note

3, at I212, and he indicates that most feelings pointing toward equality can be otherwise explained, see, e.g., id., but he also seems to believe that people may be confused at times and that
part of the point of his article is that "prescriptive equality, if acted upon, can have harmful
consequences," id. at 1263. Perhaps one can best characterize most of his discussion as a conceptual and logical analysis of how prescriptive equality fits, or does not fit, with shared fundamental
moral assumptions. Thus, he can conclude that the principle "has no substantive moral force of
its own." Id. at 1213.
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This special combination of desirable attitude and ultimate justification may strike some readers as paradoxical, but it is not hard to
explain. Justifications for criminal punishment provide a fruitful context in which to explore this point.6 1 A common debate is whether
punishment is warranted on retributive - that is, deontological - or
utilitarian grounds. 62 It certainly is possible that punishment will actually work best - that is, have the most desirable consequences - if
those who receive it and those who impose it alike think and feel that
its justification does not depend on favorable consequences. The main
idea is that punishment will be most effective if its subjects believe
that it is intrinsically deserved, instead of feeling that they are being
"used" to accomplish social objectives.
Suppose someone philosophizing about the subject has this understanding, while concluding that the standard arguments in support of
the retributive view are not persuasive. Would that person regard
punishment for crimes as a deontological or consequentialist norm?
My own view about this conceptual borderline is that a position
should count as rule-consequentialist only if its proponent thinks that
the people making moral decisions and acting reflectively should be
self-consciously guided by rule-consequentialist analysis. Thus, I count
as deontological an approach to punishment in which a theorist believes that retributive (deontological) attitudes are to be preferred to
consequentialist ones, even if the theorist also believes that the final
justification for these deontological attitudes lies in their positive social
effects.
In short, I believe that, in many aspects, people should approach
moral choices in a nonconsequentialist way, but the fundamental
reason that these moral practices are warranted is that they will have
beneficial consequences for human life. My present sense is that prescriptive equality fits into this category. 63 As we have seen, it should
not always determine outcomes, but decisionmakers rightly give it
some force apart from their conscious considerations of consequences.

61 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1344-45
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1983).
62 The utilitarian position is typically qualified by certain deontological constraints: most importantly, not punishing the innocent.
63 However, someone might argue that, even if my general observations are sound, they do
not apply to prescriptive equality, which comes into play only if one of the affected persons is
aware of the treatment the other receives. It might be said that awareness signals concern about
consequences. This issue is a difficult, complicated one. My brief response is that decisionmakers
should give some force to the principle without first ascertaining likely awareness in the circumstances, and also that an attitude may be deontological even if the principle is triggered by
awareness.
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This last Part has covered vast ranges of moral philosophy in a
few quick bounds. 64 But it is within these ranges that the genuinely
troubling questions about prescriptive equality lie. The principle of
prescriptive equality cannot simply be dismissed as empty, self-contradictory, or untrue to our reflective intuitions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Response has not attempted systematically to work out precisely when the principle of prescriptive equality has force. As I have
indicated, my reflective intuitions give strength to the principle only
when the people to be treated are significantly related in some sense,
and when the one who may receive worse treatment will be aware of
the better treatment received by his equal.
These conditions are not met when courts decide to follow precedents they have rendered years before. Furthermore, a countervailing
factor exists for civil cases that was not present in any of the examples
I have considered. If one litigant in Case 2 is to receive better than
otherwise deserved treatment because of a precedent - that is, he will
win a case he would have lost if the court setting the precedent had
not made a mistake - then the competing litigant in Case 2 will get
worse treatment than he otherwise deserves. I have not argued that
the principle of equality should authorize giving people worse treatment than they otherwise deserve. 65 In fact, I agree with Professor
Peters that the principle of prescriptive equality is not a solid foundation for the doctrine of precedent.
If one were to address the principle in a serious way, and to refine
its force and implications, one would need to examine what counts as
"related" and why relationship matters as it does. Two final examples
indicate some important implications. First, Professor Raz talks of
egalitarian principles as having "symbolic or expressive functions in
small or intimate groups.166 Professor Raz mentions a voluntary surrender of possible benefits, but his observation could apply to choices
by parents for children as well. One might believe intimate relationships matter for equal treatment largely because of the significance of
symbolic and expressive functions.
A second example is Professor Peters's consideration of retroactive
application of newly announced standards as raising issues essentially
similar to those regarding precedent. 67 Professor Peters strongly criti64 I discuss these matters in a somewhat fuller way elsewhere. See KENT GREENAWALT,
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 40-41, 159-86 (i987). In my view, many claims of a natural
duty to obey the law rest ultimately upon desirable effects for human life, although the idea of
"natural duty" is a deontological one.
65 I am not sure whether the principle has no force in that direction, or only weaker force.
66 RAZ, supra note io, at 234.
67 See Peters, supra note 2, at 2044-50.
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cizes the Supreme Court's emphasis on deontological equality in a recent retroactivity case.68 On reflection, one might think that those
individuals who are identically situated except for whose case arrives
first at the appellate court are closely enough related to trigger the
principle of prescriptive equality. The principle might then carry the
day for litigants not initially before the court, provided the opposing
parties had no strong competing reliance interest based on the old
69
standard.
The hard work, and one hopes the next steps, regarding prescriptive equality lie mainly in close analysis of such complex
considerations.
68 See id. at 2047-5o. The case is James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Soi U.S. 529
(i99i). Professor Peters compares its deontological approach unfavorably with the consequentialist analysis of precedent in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, so5 U.S. 833 (1992). See Peters, supra
note 2, at 2044-47.

69 It could matter whether the case was against the government or a private party, whether it
was civil or criminal, and whether its newly announced standard was justified on consequentialist
(for example, deterrence) or deontological grounds.

